Mr. Haile Menkerios is a veteran diplomat renowned for his extensive experience in mediation and conflict resolution. Currently serving as a Senior Advisor to the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, he has dedicated his career to advancing international peace and security. As the former United Nations Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Mr. Menkerios played a pivotal role in mediation efforts during the conflicts between the two countries, bringing one of the longest-standing civil wars in Africa to a negotiated, peaceful end. In 2011, he was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize due to his success in that role. He worked in different hot spots across Africa, such as the DRC, Madagascar, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, appointed him as the head of the UN office and special representative to the African Union in 2013.
His decades-long expertise in diplomacy, African political affairs, and peacebuilding has significantly contributed to promoting stability across the region.
SudanScope interviewed Mr. Haile Menkerios to gain valuable insights into the ongoing conflict in Sudan. Leveraging his deep knowledge of mediation and conflict resolution, the discussion explored the root causes of the war, the influence of regional and international actors, and possible pathways to sustainable peace. This interview aligns with SudanScope’s mission to foster awareness, constructive dialogue, and a deeper understanding of Sudan's journey toward democracy, peace, and human rights.
Editor: Based on your experience as a seasoned diplomat with valuable insights into Sudan’s complex political and humanitarian crises, what lessons can be applied to Sudan to avoid repeated cycles of conflict?
Haile: Firstly, more than most other African countries, Sudan is rich in ethnic and cultural diversity: It is composed of a multi ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-religious population. Yet, the country has, at least since its independence, been defined and governed by the ruling elites in Khartoum as just an Arab and Muslim country. This marginalization of the non-Arab and, particularly, non-Muslim peoples in the peripheries has continued to cause violent conflicts between the ruling elites and those marginalized. This polarization and conflict intensified particularly since the ascendance of the Islamists to power, which further alienated these groups.
Second, the Sudanese military, whose creation predates that of independent Sudan, came to control the country's power and resources (directly or indirectly). With the Islamists dominating that institution, not only did the conflict between the ruling elites and the marginalized peripheries intensify further, but it also led to an overall pauperization of the whole lower classes in the country and deeper inequality, eventually resulting in a mass uprising across the country in 2019. The conflict thus widened to take both an ethnic and a class dimension. The competition and breakout of war between two factions of the military have exacerbated and confused the nature of the basic conflicts in Sudan, but they do not change it. I believe there is a need to have a deeper understanding of the double-layered nature of the conflict and to adopt appropriate strategies to solve it. The vast majority of Sudanese are interested in establishing a united, democratic, and peaceful Sudan, and many have already started working in that direction. Many such Sudanese are calling for the formation of a federal, secular, and democratic Sudan as a solution to aim for.
Editor: What strategies have proven effective in mediating between deeply polarized groups in Sudan?
Haile: The experience that can be cited is that which was carried out by IGAD to resolve the conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM of South Sudan. That presentation was the Declaration of Principles, which boiled down to “either the government of Sudan accepts a secular governance in Sudan, or accepts the right of the South Sudanese to decide whether they want to continue as part of Sudan, ruled by an Islamist ideology, or separate”. This was the defining point for agreement on a solution. The government of Sudan, which was militarily and politically under pressure from the IGAD region and the Troika (the US, the UK, and the EU) as well, was forced to accept the proposal, i.e., the referendum for South Sudan, rather than drop its Islamist ideology and control of the rest of Sudan. The acceptance of this principle by both was the defining common point for a solution to the conflict. The referendum led to separation and stopped the war with South Sudan, but unfortunately not with the other marginalized nationalities within Sudan.
Editor: How can mediators balance listening to conflicting parties while proposing impartial solutions?
Haile: Mediators must listen to the positions and propositions of negotiating parties and be impartial in helping them reach solutions they can accept, but impartiality does not mean neutrality. There is a significant difference between the two.
A mediator must make sure that universal principles of human rights and the inalienable rights of peoples, including minorities, are upheld. These principles are enshrined in international conventions and agreements. Being impartial means ensuring respect for these common tenets of human and state interaction, including international humanitarian law, equally by all negotiating parties. For instance, negotiating parties, particularly those that have been engaged in war, may want to absolve themselves of crimes that one or both may have committed against civilians during their confrontation. A mediator would have to point out to the negotiating parties, or whichever party wants full amnesty for crimes it committed against non-combatant civilians, that there must be an acknowledgement of and redress to such universally recognized crimes.
Editor: How can international sanctions be designed or enhanced to compel the conflicting parties to enter meaningful negotiations?
Haile: I believe the starting point should have been the decision by the AU and the UN that the conflict in Sudan is not only an infringement on the right of the Sudanese people to live in peace but also a threat to regional and wider international peace. That then would have led to putting pressure on the warring parties to negotiate peace or face consequences. It would have put greater pressure on them to negotiate for a solution, at least to stop fighting if not accept fundamental solutions, which only the Sudanese people can effectively pressure them to accept. Given international pressures to face the consequences of continued fighting, the parties would also have been forced to respond to popular demands and at least compromise. With the new reality of increasing divisions based on differing interests among the key global actors, however, institutions for collective security such as the UN Security Council have been weakened to virtual inaction. That weakness has in fact opened the door for the uncurbed intervention of regional competitors whose support to the warring sides has intensified the damage the war is causing Sudan and its people.
Editor: In light of systematic human rights violations, war crimes, and sexual and gender-based violence committed by both sides, how can such evidence be leveraged to impose stricter, internationally backed sanctions to curb violence against civilians and ensure justice?
Haile: Again, international defense of common principles of human and people’s rights have been tremendously reduced because of conflicts between the major powers in the world. However, creating pressure, explaining how lack of attention to such principles in Sudan can have negative spillover effects in the immediate region and globally, is what Sudanese victims and their champions should indefatigably push for. Many Sudanese civil society groups have been trying their best to air the plight of the Sudanese people; I believe a similar, and in fact greater, prioritization of such a campaign by the political groups should also pursued.
Editor: Considering the threats posed by Red Sea security issues and international terrorism to regional and global peace, how can these concerns drive the international community to intensify efforts toward a peaceful resolution?
Haile: The major powers in the international community are indeed aware of the threat war in the Red Sea area could create to international trade at least, but I doubt they see the civil war in Sudan actually causing that much damage to such a concern. Many key powers indeed have bases of a military nature in Djibouti and must be following developments in Sudan and the Red Sea zone closely. So far, the major powers do not seem to have seen that much of a threat from the Sudanese civil war to warrant interest-based intervention.
The utilization of such “common” threats to garner support is also always risky as you may not have shared views of right and wrong regarding those “threats”. It is always important to understand the interests of whoever you want to influence one way or the other, making sure that you would not be instrumentalized, or creating unnecessary other enemies at the same time.
Editor: With the war’s devastating implications reaching critical levels globally, how might the world respond to these pressing challenges of security and resource mobilization?
Haile: I think we need to be realistic. Let us start with Africa. If the question of unity in diversity does not work in Sudan, it can hardly be expected to work in Africa as a whole- a goal for which the African Union was created. But African nations, immersed in problems of their own at the moment, are hardly in a position to prioritize that objective. Globally as well, the implications of the Sudan war to the security and stability of the entire Sahel region and the Red Sea basin is going to be quite significant with wider implications as well. I think many may understand this, but other immediate national interests and considerations, rather than regional or global ones, are what are preoccupying states and regional or global organizations at the moment. I believe Sudanese activists must recognize that and develop strategies of their own to mobilize their people around as a priority; it is doable. That is when others may come to support as well.
Editor: What strategies have proven effective in mediating between deeply polarized groups in Sudan?
Haile: The answer is obvious from the South Sudan experience. It is either adopt appropriate strategies for the coexistence of a pluralistic society, for unity in diversity, or allow people to choose to separate. I would hate to contemplate where Sudan may end up if the former were not the choice.
Editor: How should external actors and allies engage in peace-building and reconciliation efforts without exacerbating divisions or imposing their agendas?
Haile: International institutions such as the UN, the AU, and to an extent the EU, the Arab League, etc., and independent international organizations are more impartial in their choice of who and how to support peacebuilding and reconciliation. In the end, however, it is the concerned society that is best placed to identify its needs and devise strategies and programs for reconciliation and reconstruction, and direct external assistance towards those needs. Reconciliation takes place when there is a harmonization of interests and a certain redress for past injustices. The pursuit of transitional justice could be one way to address these.
Editor: Reflecting on your experiences as a UN Special Envoy and the lessons you learned from your diplomatic career, what is the most valuable advice you can give to young diplomats and mediators working in conflict zones?
Haile: Diplomats and potential mediators need to understand that those who are in conflict know what they want and why they want it, and have decided to fight for it. Start from an understanding of that point of departure; learn it from them. Considering that most belligerents calculate what they stand to gain, but generally not the cost of it to them, i.e., what they have to pay for it as well. A good mediator starts from an understanding of those positions and makes sure that each side calculates the cost of war as well. Eventually, before proposing any solution, the mediator needs to ask how each side thinks/proposes the conflict should be resolved. Even if the mediator proposes a solution that may take little from their proposals, the feeling that their positions and proposals have been considered enhances their confidence in the impartiality of the mediator. I learned from experience that it is not my wisdom on how things should be solved, but my readiness to listen and consider what I hear that helped me be of assistance. Eventually, people may reach the point where they consider their gains and losses in war and decide one way or the other.
Editor: Based on previous engagements of the international community in peace processes and your experience, what is the international community's priority in Sudan: stability or democratic transition?
Haile: States are formed to protect the interests of their citizens. For the most part, therefore, their priority is ensuring stability before necessarily democracy in their relations with external countries. The question is, what leads to stability? Can any state have and maintain stability if there is no internal harmony, i.e., if the lowest necessary conditions for stability do not exist? The next question any country considers then is, how much are its interests affected by instability in others, and which ones affect its interests the most? For instance, let us take the US. It considers how much its vital interests are affected by the conflict in Sudan as opposed to those in Ukraine, Palestine, or Yemen and decides on its actions accordingly. It is incumbent on Sudanese who want support for democracy and stability from a particular country, to explain how the lack of democracy in Sudan and the raging conflict there lead to instability, and how much that instability affects the interests of that country.
Editor: There is growing vulnerability along the Sudan-Chad border, raising concerns about the potential presence of terrorist groups. Could this pose a threat not only to the region but also to international peace and security? Do you think the international community perceives this threat?
Haile: I am sure many within the international community understand the potential threat. However, they may not be ready to act on it.
During the first two decades of this century, there was an awareness within the countries of the Sahel region of the danger posed by uncontrolled armed groups operating outside the authority of any state in the region, and the affected countries had formed a formidable alliance (the G-5 Sahel) to combat such groups. Indeed, they were relatively effective in doing so.
No group should be allowed to exist and function as a threat to the security of others. Unfortunately, internal conflicts like the one in Sudan, much like the one in Libya, create power vacuums, a conducive atmosphere for such uncontrolled sectarian and terrorist groups to exist and operate their criminal activities. The power vacuum creates a conducive atmosphere for international outlaw groups to operate as well; the presence and operations of the Wagner Group (now called Africa Corps) in the region is a prime example.
The AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council acknowledge the existence of such groups in the region and have, at times, passed condemning resolutions but have fallen short of taking collective action to control them. Equally, they have so far failed to consider the Sudan conflict a threat to international peace, which would have been a crucial step for mobilizing collective action for stability there. The interest and attention of the big powers in the world are elsewhere, not in Africa and definitely not in Sudan. Africa is also not taking any meaningful action on the uncontrolled armed groups in the Sahel region or Sudan, as it is engulfed in conflicts in many parts of the continent and is currently divided and weak.
Editor: With multiple platforms working on mediation to stop the war and reclaim Sudan’s democratic transition, how can these efforts be unified to avoid contradictions and improve effectiveness?
Haile: The UN recognizes that regional organizations should play a leading role in resolving conflicts within their regions. This principle applies to the Sudan conflict, and due to the weakness and division within IGAD, the AU should take the lead in coordinating efforts among IGAD, the Arab League, the UN, and other relevant parties. However, as I mentioned earlier, the AU's internal weaknesses and preoccupation with other crises have hindered its effectiveness. Rather than criticizing, however, we should encourage and push the AU to assume its leadership role and strengthen its capacity to coordinate mediation efforts. It is hoped that the new leadership at the AU Commission do better at that.
Editor: Both conflicting parties are increasingly relying on allied militias. What risks do these groups pose to a potential peace deal?
Haile: The fighting is often described as just between the SAF and the RSF, but in reality, militias play a significant role on both sides. These militias could grow in influence, making them harder to control even if a peace deal is reached between the main belligerents.
Without a strong, united civilian front, these armed groups could undermine any peace process. The solution lies in rallying civilian forces into a broad anti-war coalition capable of steering the peace process and shaping the new Sudan. For that to happen, Sudanese civilian groups, particularly the youth, must understand the root causes of the conflict in the country -mismanagement of diversity and resources, in my opinion- and adopt correct solutions that will ensure justice and equality for all Sudanese and thus cement their unity.
Editor: Many atrocities and human rights violations have occurred during this war. How can reconciliation efforts balance justice with the need for sustainable peace?
Haile: Transitional justice is essential because wars dismantle existing systems of maintaining societal justice. When peace is restored, the challenge is how to address the injustice inflicted during the conflict.
The best approach is for the people to agree on a framework that combines accountability, redress, and reconciliation. Transitional justice is not about ignoring past crimes and wrongs but about creating mechanisms that not only ensure redress but also protect people so that such atrocities never happen again. Sudanese society must lead this process, combining ethical codes with collective memory to achieve both justice and reconciliation.
Editor: What would be the consequence if Sudan fails to adopt a federal and democratic governance model?
Haile: History shows that as interstate relations moved towards stability, multi-ethnic, multicultural societies (the empires of the past) either democratized or disintegrated. Sudan has been such a society, and because it failed to manage diversity properly and to “make unity attractive”, it has already begun to disintegrate with South Sudan’s secession. If the hitherto existing exclusionary ideology, i.e., defining Sudan as an Arab and Islamic state, persists, many Sudanese in regions like Darfur, Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states may also seek to separate, and we may see the further disintegration of Sudan.
The Ethiopian federal model provides a valuable lesson. Ethiopians recognized the diversity in their country and adopted a federal model, which all accepted. The shortcoming was that despite adopting the federal system based on power sharing between the different regional governments and the central government, a highly centralized national government dominated by one party was established, which undermined that system. Thus, unfortunately, we see conflicts erupting again in the country. Sudan must learn from this experience and adopt a genuinely decentralized federal structure that represents and empowers all communities equally.
Editor: The military holds significant power in Sudan. How can this be reconstructed to prioritize civilian governance?
Haile: Military reform must begin with a broader societal agreement on governance by Sudanese civilians. The army must be an institution of the state created to defend the nation, not to govern it.
A civilian government must define the military’s role as limited to national defense, with no political or sectarian affiliations and engagements, and with budgets defined and allocated by the state. The army's alliances must be dictated by national interest, defined by the state, not the self-interest of military leaders. To get there, of course, Sudanese need to be realistic and think about such changes as a process. The absolute imperative is that the changes should happen under civilian control.
Editor: What is your final message?
Haile: I want to commend the role the youth are playing in Sudan and across Africa. Adversity often awakens the best in people, and I see hope in the young generation.
Our region has vast resources, but, engaged in internal and regional conflicts, we have been mismanaging them. The establishment of a democratic and progressive Sudan could be a game-changer. Sudan could be the hub for developing our region's resources for mutual benefit. The Nile waters, for example, could be a source of shared prosperity if countries worked together. Why not dream of a future when Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, and other countries of the Nile basin form a consortium to harness Nile waters for collective benefit?
It is the youth who can make this vision a reality. They must dream beyond borders and work towards a unified, prosperous region and eventually Africa as a longer-term goal to be reached step by step. It is doable: Even Europe, with all its history of thousands of years of competition and internal turbulence, is, dictated by the necessity of economic survival, moving in that direction.
